Sometimes it makes one wish they had paid more attention in school? Or does it? Good thing for the internet, right? Is it Legislative Intent or Legislative History? They are different as you can see from the diagram above. My point of the message is, many words can mean many things. It all depends on how you use them. Words have changed over the years even though the substance or item the word describes is still the same. Take for instance, loan servicer. Back before the securitization scheme, the lender was either known as the loan servicer or the lender used a loan servicer service. It is not a new concept. Prior to or after securitization, the word changed to mortgage servicer. Why? Is it like ―manufactured home‖ instead of ―mobile home” because it sounds more appealing? No matter how you name it, or change it, the word still provides that same product.

Looking backwards in history at Texas law, it may be easier to for one to connect the dots to reveal why Texas is a victim to unlawful, unethical, unprofessional business practices by the non-public banks and its agents.

After reading this paper, the reader should come to realize that the mortgage banking law firm, like the rest of the mortgage banking industry, were anticipating a revision to Article 3, Uniform Commercial Code that would include the electronic promissory note, of which, never happened and these actors overlooked a fatal flaw to their criminal activity, Texas Local Government code Chapter 192, section 007. I have to admit, their plan was brilliant. It reminded me of the Trojan horse of long ago. You know what happened there, right?

These actors most likely began brainstorming their intent prior to 1986, when Congress changed the tax code in H.R. 38388. One of those changes in the tax code was the creation of the Real Estate Mortgage Investment Conduit (REMIC)9.

Anything after the great crime of 2003 in Texas is only an economic, continuous, corporate crime complimentary to H.B. 149310 and proof of the mortgage banking law firm‘s accomplishments. To do this, take a look from 2003 when the meat of the intangible foreclosure process changed and determine why this mortgage banking law firm took such a bold step cause the centuries of commercial law to become ambiguous and if reviewed more closely, will find there to be a strong possibility of being unconstitutional and in conflict with commercial negotiability laws in other states or countries.

If MERS was not a lawfully functioning ―clearing house‖ for the purchasing and selling of ―servicing rights‖ to investors prior to June 2000, how could MERS lawfully release a lien? This was accomplished in instrument # 200000001411 as recorded in Williamson County, Texas Official public records. November 17, 1999, by Regina Lashley, Certifying Officer, signed and stamped the MERS corporate seal upon said instrument. Apparently signed and notarized in Nebraska. As it also appears, Mortgage and Trust, Inc. was the original beneficiary as recorded on the 1st day of September1987.

While we are speaking of public records, Official public records will reveal a chain of title beginning with a warranty deed with vendor‘s lien that is recorded by the seller of the real property. Upon receipt of moneys, it is customarily and by operation of law14, the warranty deed with vendor‘s lien is released by the grantee of the deed of trust, which is usually a lender of some sort. So, by the end of this paper you should begin to realize the only colorable claim available from official public records will be the warranty deed with vendor’s lien, since the security instrument, as the actors defined it in chapter 51, of the Texas Property Code, was a contract in which the scrivener craftily worded to induce an unsuspecting grantor into agreeing to sign was by design and fraud in the factum.

The word mortgage servicer made its way toward becoming Texas law in 2003, in H.B. 149315. The House Bill‘s author, a Republican State Representative16,17, an attorney in Dallas18, whose litigates clients such as JPMorgan Chase, Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation, concocted this House Bill either alone, or in conjunction with others. A certain witness19 ―for‖ this particular House Bill 1493 is now a known robo-signer everyone seems to be looking for. This certain actor is also a chief litigator for a well known foreclosure mill, a.k.a. mortgage banking law firm in Addison Texas.

H.B. 1493 became effective January 1, 2004. In this sad time for statutory revisions of Texas laws, the "Provisions Generally Applicable To Liens" chapter changed also. In previous versions of the Texas Property code, containing chapter 51 contained two (2) sections, §51.001, Effect on Other Liens, §51.002, Sale of Real Property under Contract Lien. Now there are more sections that compliment the securitization process. The previous version enacted by §51, S.B. 74820, chapter 57621, in 1983. In versions prior to 2004, Chapter §51 of the Texas Property code, the Lender was known as ―holder of the debt‖. In 2004 that changed. The word ―holder‖ was struck from the old school way of the debt and replaced with ―mortgage servicer of the debt. Prior revisions of Chapter 51 did not reflect the more appealing definitions instilled into the 2004 enacted revision. To accomplish what had already begun in Texas, modifications were needed with Texas laws to make it all work. According to any of the bill analysis‘, it is written, “There are some practices that have been developed to manage the foreclosure process that are not expressly authorized by the Property Code.” If you didn‘t catch that subtle statement, the intent of the author of the bill is to change Texas law so that it will fit the ―practices‖ that have been developed during the beta electronic foreclosure process. In essence, circumnavigate the law. I‘m not sure about you, but United States v. Hibernia National Bank does come to my mind. Commercial customs do not apply where law provides otherwise. Also, the statement in that same section, the author purports an appeals court ruling that was not in favor of their current foreclosure practices which according to the Court, did not appear to be according to law. Accordingly, it appears the author‘s thoughts were to re-arrange the laws to fit their needs, right? It was.

Records will reflect there are many actors involved in this criminal activity that has spread like a plague across the country and the globe. There too many to name as this activity was conducted farther back than most realize, but rest assured those names are written down in the book of names.

It may not be obvious to the masses, but it is recognized by those in the know realized that the change in the tax code in 1986 opened the gates to hell22. That change allow for the creation of REMICS, and since EFT, or the ―electronic fund transfers act‖23 in 1980 had mellowed a bit, it is apparent the banks were looking to the new age of electronics. Whether unethical acts were taking place then will be left to the researcher in that area or era.

In 1983, and due to statutory revisions required by previous Texas laws, revision construction began to take place in Texas by Senate Bill No. 748.24 At that time only two (2) sections existed in Chapter 51, ―Provisions Generally Applicable To Liens‖ within the Texas Property Code.

In 1989, another revision of Chapter 51 occurred. In this House Bill No. 128525, Texas Local Government Code was statutorily amended as "Relating to the creation, maintenance, preservation, microfilming, destruction, and other disposition of, and access to, governmental records; providing penalties." On section in particular was 192.007, "Records of Release And Other Actions".

Moving forward to 1993, and regarding Texas, the Happy Frappy group, being members of the mortgage bankers association were aware of the "Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act”26 to be ―amended the laws governing federally chartered banks in order to restore the laws' competitiveness with the recently relaxed laws governing state-chartered banks. The goal was the return to a balance between the benefits of a state bank charter versus a federal bank charter”, allegedly an expansion of the Community Reinvestment Act of 197727. Today the revelation of the intent for that "Act" is beginning to open the eyes of the blind.

In 1997, a charismatic leader, Michael C. Barrett, now deceased, then known doing business as Barrett Burke Wilson Castle Daffin & Frappier was appointed to the ―Home Equity Loan Foreclosure Rules Task Force‖ in November 199730 ―for the purpose of drafting rules of civil and appellate procedure to provide for the expeditious and equitable foreclosure of home equity loans‖. Will satan have mercy on his soul? As it appears, some type of delay caused the Texas Supreme Court to extend that task force deadline was extended to January 15, 1998. This would fall within the timeframe of the push to repeal of the “Glass–Steagall Act‖ by ―removing barriers in the market among banking companies, securities companies and insurance companies that prohibited any one institution from acting as any combination of an investment bank, a commercial bank, and an insurance company. With the passage of the Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act, commercial banks, investment banks, securities firms, and insurance companies were allowed to consolidate‖ and because of a certain merger in 1998 between Citicorp and Traveler's Group was a violation of the Glass–Steagall Act and the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, the Federal Reserve gave the commercial bank and the insurance company a pat on the wrist with a temporary waiver in 1998, it was less than a year it took to replace the Glass–Steagall Act with the the “Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act” (GLB), also known as the “Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999”.31

In Texas, from 1993 to the present, another affiliate actor of now, Barrett Daffin Frappier Turner & Engel, provided many articles for the education of liens and MERS. This particular person was a scrivener for the Task Force meetings. In 1999, he proclaimed he was Texas counsel for MERS. This particular person also claimed the bragging rights of altering the Texas Constitution and the Property code concerning Trustees in §51.007. Combined, G. Tommy Bastian and Michael C. Barrett, a mortgage banking law firm that provides foreclosure processing services for "Too big to fail" banks have diligently worked to alter Texas laws for a futuristic monetary reward. This did take many years to accomplish, it was not an overnight sensation until January 1, 2004. And is reflected in public records, year 2000. By 2002 and after E-SIGN, UETA were enacted, Bastian provided ―MERS: What is it and what is its impact on foreclosure‖ to the 12th annual Robert C. Sneed Texas Land Title institute conference in San Antonio, Texas. This was an opportune time to educate Texas persons to this intangible illusion. With E-SIGN enacted, and including wording in Sec. 7021, Transferable records essentially 7021(a)(1)(A) "would be a note under Article 3 of the Uniform Commercial Code" this illusion was made easier to comprehend. However, it was not disclosed to the masses that the Uniform Commercial Code did not include electronic promissory notes to support 7021(a)(1)(A). As it is witnessed, the UCC 3 part was never redacted from E-SIGN. Nevertheless, in Williamson County, Texas, dating back to 1993, electronic conversions can be seen in the records. This conversion process started falling off around 2000 as MERS was alleged to function lawfully because after all, MERS was designed to be in compliance with E-SIGN and UETA.

In September 2007, The Texas Supreme Court issued misc. Docket # 07-9160, Order creating the Task Force On Judicial Foreclosure Rules. Meeting minutes from the November 7, 2007 meeting of that task force reflect the mentality of certain persons appointed to that panel. It also reflects that, and according to Michael C. Barrett, founder and chairman of a mortgage banking law firm, mortgage documents are made up as needed. According to articles, he served as a trusted advisor on mortgage banking issue for the Texas Supreme Court32.

That order creating the task force was not really the idea of the Texas Supreme Court. In July 2007, the foreclosure mill‘s affiliate G. Tommy Bastian sent a letter33 to the Honorable Chief Justice Wallace B. Jefferson, basically saying "me and the guys were talking around the water fountain we we’ve decided some rules need to change". Of course one of the several members of the Equity and Reverse Mortgage rules just happen to be Michael C. Barrett, founder and chairman of the foreclosure mill.

Interestingly, the 2012 edition of the Texas Supreme Court Advisory Committee January meeting speaks of the results from the previous 735, 736 committees hard work. One thing though, according to page 23839, 23840 [pg 22 of 290] the Chairman, Mr. Babcock has invited the public to talk to him or Justice Hecht if anybody thinks that a particular problem or a rule needs studying, It is an exciting read, see how much these lawyers know with the difference between "shall" and "must". Think that is something? Read this on page 32; MR. HAMILTON: In 2(b)(1) -- I'm sorry, 2(a), "notice of a hearing, if given," why do we have that in there? If the hearing can be ex parte, it seems like we're almost suggesting to the judge that we have to give notice to the other side, and I'm not sure that that's what we want to do. However these people acted or reacted one judge made some sense when it came to affidavits; (23681, pg 44) I mean, what's bad about requiring somebody to come into court and testify and prove whatever needs to be proved rather than just doing an affidavit? That bothers me.

Art. 1.03. OBJECTS OF THIS CODE. This Code is intended to embrace rules applicable to the prevention and prosecution of offenses against the laws of this State, and to make the rules of procedure in respect to the prevention and punishment of offenses intelligible to the officers who are to act under them, and to all persons whose rights are to be affected by them. Art. 1.04. DUE COURSE OF LAW. No citizen of this State shall be deprived of life, liberty, property, privileges or immunities, or in any manner disfranchised, except by the due course of the law of the land.

Fraud occurring when a legal instrument as actually executed differs from the one intended for execution by the person who executes it, or when the instrument may have had no legal existence. • Compared to fraud in the inducement, fraud in the factum occurs only rarely, as when a blind person signs a mortgage when misleadingly told that it is just a letter. — Also termed fraud in the execution; fraud in the making. Cf. fraud in the inducement. [Cases: Contracts 94(1). C.J.S. Contracts §§ 136, 139–140, 156–160, 170–171, 173–174.]

crime. An act that the law makes punishable; the breach of a legal duty treated as the subject matter of a criminal proceeding. — Also termed criminal wrong. See OFFENSE(1).

CRIME-FRAUD EXCEPTION

The doctrine that neither the attorney–client privilege nor the attorney-work-product privilege protects attorney–client communications that are in furtherance of a current or planned crime or fraud. Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 53 S.Ct. 465 (1933); In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 731 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1984). [Cases: Federal Civil Procedure 1600(3); Witnesses 201(2). C.J.S. Witnesses § 336.

1. A constituent part of a claim that must be proved for the claim to succeed <Burke failed to prove the element of proximate cause in prosecuting his negligence claim>.2.Patents. A discretely claimed component of a patent claim. • For a prior-art reference to anticipate a claim, it must teach each and every claim element. To recover for patent infringement, the plaintiff must prove that the accused product infringes every element of at least one claim, either literally or under the doctrine of equivalents. — Also termed (in sense 2) limitation. See DOCTRINE OF EQUIVALENTS. [Cases: Patents 101(1). C.J.S. Patents §§ 140–142.]

Under United States law, an element of a crime (or element of an offense) is one of a set of facts that must all be proven to convict a defendant of a crime. Before a court finds a defendant guilty of a criminal offense, the prosecution must present evidence that, even when opposed by any evidence the defense may choose to present, is credible and sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed each element of the particular crime charged. The component parts that make up any particular crime vary depending on the crime.

The state of mind accompanying an act, esp. a forbidden act. • While motive is the inducement to do some act, intent is the mental resolution or determination to do it. When the intent to do an act that violates the law exists, motive becomes immaterial. Cf. MOTIVE; SCIENTER.

"The phrase 'with intent to,' or its equivalents, may mean any one of at least four different things: — (1) That the intent referred to must be the sole or exclusive intent; (2) that it is sufficient if it is one of several concurrent intents; (3) that it must be the chief or dominant intent, any others being subordinate or incidental; (4) that it must be a determining intent, that is to say, an intent in the absence of which the act would not have been done, the remaining purposes being insufficient motives by themselves. It is a question of construction which of those meanings is the true one in the particular case." John Salmond, Jurisprudence 383–84 (Glanville L. Williams ed., 10th ed. 1947). implied intent. A person's state of mind that can be inferred from speech or conduct, or from language used in an instrument to which the person is a party. (source: Black‘s Law Dictionary)

CIVIL RIGHTS

The Civil Rights Acts in general, and 1963 in particular, are cast in terms so broad as to suggest that in suits brought under these sections, common law doctrines of immunity can never be a bar. It should be equally clear that both the language and the purpose of the Civil Rights Acts are inconsistent with the, application of common law notions of official immunity in all suits brought under these provisions. Jacobsen V. Henne, 1966, Ca. 2 NY 355, F. 2d 129, 133-4; Anderson v. Nosser, 1971, Ca. 5, Miss., 428 F.2d 183, 01 MCD on other grounds 456 F.2d 835. Three separate reasons, however, may be discerned from the opinion. The first of these is that a judges decision is appealable and therefore, the party need not sue the judicial officer to vindicate his rights. (See Jennings, Note 11, at 272; E. Jennings, tort Liability of Administrative Officers, 21 Minn. L. Rev.)

42 USC 1986 provides: Every person who, having knowledge that any of the wrongs conspired to be done, and mentioned in the preceding section (1985 of Title 42) are about to be committed, and having power to prevent or aid in preventing the commission of same, neglects or refuses so to do, if such wrongful act be committed, shall be liable to the party injured, or his legal representatives, for all damages caused by such wrongful act which such person by reasonable diligence could have prevented; and such damages may be recovered in an action on the case; and any number of persons guilty of such wrongful act, neglect, or refusal, may be joined as defendants in the action. Judicial definition that misuse of power possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because wrong-doer is clothed with authority of state law is action taken under color of state law within this section is applicable to judge. Duke v. state of Texas, DC Tex. 1971, 327 F.Sup- 1218. When a judge exceeds his jurisdiction and grants or denies that beyond his lawful authority to grant or deny, he has perpetrated a "non-judicial" action. Yates v. Hoffman Estates (1962, DC Ill.) 209 F.Sup. 757.

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